Judy v. Hanford Environmental Health Foundation, No. 19047-1-III, (Slip Op., April 24, 2001).
Apr. 2001 JUDY v. HANFORD ENVIR. HEALTH FOUND. 1
Cause No. 19047-1-III
[No. 19047-1-III. Division Three. April 24, 2001.]
MARY ESTHER JUDY, ) No. 19047-1-III
)
Appellant, )
) Division Three
v. ) Panel One
)
HANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH )
FOUNDATION, LARRY B. SMICK, ) PUBLISHED OPINION
D.O., and BECHTEL HANFORD )
INCORPORATED, )
)
Respondents. ) FILED __April 24, 2001____
Trial Court: Superior Court, Grant County,
No. 99-2-00167-0, Carolyn Brown, J., December 30, 1999.
Critchlow, Williams & Schuster, by David E. Williams, for
appellant.
Meyer, Fluegge & Tenny, by Jerome R. Aiken; Halvorson & Saunders,
by Larry E. Halvorson; Stokes, Lawrence, by Frederick T. Rasmussen,
and Lisa M. Herb, for respondents.
SWEENEY, J. - Mary E. Judy sued her employer and an occupational
health organization for injuries sustained on the job. The questions
presented are whether the failure to inform her of her physical
limitations following a negative physical capacities evaluation amounted
to a deliberate injury on the part of her employer or a breach of the
duty of care by the physician responsible for her occupational
evaluation. We conclude that the employer's conduct, while arguably
negligent, did not meet the certainty threshold required by Birklid v.
Boeing Co. /1 We also conclude that the Hanford Environmental Health
Foundation was not Ms. Judy's employer and was therefore not entitled to
the immunity afforded by the Industrial Insurance Act. Nor did it breach
any duty of care to Ms. Judy. We therefore affirm the trial court's
summary dismissal of the action.
FACTS
The Hanford Reservation is owned by the United States and managed by the
Department of Energy (DOE). DOE operates through various contractors. One
of these is Bechtel Hanford, Inc. Bechtel employed Ms. Judy as a manual
laborer in its Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D) classification.
Hanford Environmental Health Foundation (HEHF), also under contract
with DOE, provides occupational medical services at Hanford. Its
responsibilities include medically evaluating workers to determine
whether they can meet the physical qualifications of their jobs. Larry
B. Smick, D.O., is a staff physician employed full time by HEHF to
provide occupational health care to Hanford employees. Carl Loera, P.T.,
is an off-site physical therapist.
In May 1997, Bechtel referred Ms. Judy to HEHF for evaluation of her
physical capacity to work as a D&D laborer. In June 1997, Dr. Smick
referred Ms. Judy to Mr. Loera. Neither Dr. Smick nor any other HEHF
employee actually saw Ms. Judy. On July 14, 1997, based on Mr. Loera's
functional capacity evaluation, Dr. Smick reported to Bechtel that the
demands of her job exceeded Ms. Judy's grip strength and lifting
capacity. He concluded that "the worker is not physically capable of
performing the physical essential functions of the job." Clerk's Papers
at 286.
No one told Ms. Judy of the results. Nor did Bechtel act on Dr.
Smick's report. And Ms. Judy continued to work as a laborer, without
accommodation. On March 8, 1998, Ms. Judy was injured on the job. She
applied for and received worker's compensation benefits.
In July 1998, Bechtel laid Ms. Judy off. Its termination letter cited
the July 1997 HEHF evaluation that she was physically unable to perform
the essentials of the job with or without accommodation. This was Ms.
Judy's first notification of her functional limitations.
Ms. Judy sued HEHF and Dr. Smick for negligence, alleging breach of the
duty to inform her of her special vulnerability to injury. She later
amended her complaint to include Bechtel as a defendant. She alleged
Bechtel forfeited the employer immunity afforded by the Industrial
Insurance Act (IIA) because it willfully disregarded actual knowledge
that her injury was certain to occur.
HEHF and Dr. Smick moved for summary judgment (CR 56(b)), claiming the
action was barred by the immunity provided by the IIA. Bechtel filed a
CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. The court granted both motions.
DISCUSSION
Bechtel Hanford
Industrial Insurance Immunity-Intentional Acts. The IIA immunizes
employers from civil tort actions for workplace injuries. Seattle-First
Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wn.2d 230, 242, 588 P.2d 1308
(1978). The Act provides the exclusive remedy for injured workers. RCW
51.04.010; Shoreline Concrete, 91 W
n.2d at 241. Employers are immune from
civil lawsuits for nonintentional workplace injuries. Flanigan v. Dep't of
Labor & Indus., 123 Wn.2d 418, 422, 869 P.2d 14 (1994).
But RCW 51.24.020 creates an exception to the exclusive remedy rule.
An employer is not exempt if it has actual knowledge that injury is
certain to occur and willfully disregards that knowledge. Birklid v.
Boeing Co., 127 Wn.2d 853, 865, 904 P.2d 278 (1995).
Ms. Judy contends Bechtel willfully disregarded actual knowledge
that she was physically incapable of doing her job; and this, she
believes, is knowledge that injury was certain to occur. Bechtel thereby
forfeited the protections of the IIA. Id. Bechtel responds that the
Birklid exception to employer immunity requires more than mere
negligence, or even gross negligence. In fact, even acting with
substantial certainty that injury will result is not enough.
Folsom v. Burger King, 135 Wn.2d 658, 666-67, 958 P.2d 301 (1998).
To pierce the statutory shield protecting employers from civil suits,
the worker must prove two elements. First, that the employer had certain
knowledge injury would occur. Stenger v. Stanwood Sch. Dist., 95 Wn. App. 802,
812, 977 P.2d 660 (1999). Second, that the employer willfully
disregarded that knowledge. Id. at 813. Unless a reasonable jury could
conclude that both prongs are met, summary judgment was required. Id.
Nothing here even approaches this threshold.
The deliberate conduct test of Birklid is narrowly applied. It does
not include negligence. In some jurisdictions, conduct with "substantial
certainty" of causing injury is sufficient to meet the test. But this is
not so in Washington. Birklid expressly rejects the "substantial
certainty" test. Birklid, 127 Wn.2d at 865. In Birklid, workers became
ill from exposure to chemical fumes. Boeing management saw them becoming
ill, knew they would become ill, but continued to use the chemical. The
court held that this was "willful disregard." Id. at 863.
Ms. Judy relies on Birklid and Stenger to support her position here
that Bechtel willfully disregarded her risk of injury. Both cases are
easily distinguished. In Birklid, Boeing knew, from substantial
experience, that employees exposed to phenol-formaldehyde would get sick.
Supervisors had predicted problems based on previous use of the
compounds. Birklid, 127 Wn.2d at 857. Boeing knew that the safe
exposure level set by the manufacturer was not safe because employees got
sick at that exposure level. Id. So when employees did get sick, the
court concluded it was no accident. Id. at 863. The consequences may
not have been desired. But Boeing knew that the consequences were
inevitable.
That same level of certainty was also present in Stenger. Stenger,
95 Wn. App. at 816-17. There, a young, multi-handicapped, special education
student had caused between 1,316 and 1,347 injuries to school district
staff. He had inflicted injuries on almost a daily basis. Supervisors
knew that their staff would continue to suffer injuries if they worked
with this student. Id. at 812-13. Given this level of certainty, the
court accepted the worker's argument that "the [d]istrict accepted some
level of injury to the staff" as a consequence of working with this
student. Id. at 815. Or at least a jury could reasonably conclude that
the district had willfully disregarded its knowledge that injuries would
continue. Id. at 816-17. The court then reversed a summary dismissal.
This level of certainty is not present here. It can hardly be said
that Ms. Judy's employer knew she would be injured, or that injury was
such a certainty it should have known. Ms. Judy was presently performing
the job. She injured her back while operating a pallet jack and a large
box fell on the tracks. Dr. Smick's report to Bechtel did not predict
with certainty actual future injuries. It simply discussed her
limitations. This does not then impart actual knowledge that injuries
will occur.
Here, it is arguably foreseeable, or maybe even substantially certain,
that Ms. Judy would eventually be injured. These facts do not, however,
rise to the level of actual knowledge of certain injury required by
Birklid.
CR 12(b)(6) Rather Than CR 56 Dismissal. Ms. Judy contends the
court erred by granting judgment on the pleadings. She stated a cause of
action under the willful disregard exception to the immunity provisions of
the IIA and therefore stated a valid claim. Ms. Judy complains that the
trial judge denied her the opportunity to present evidence beyond the
pleadings which might have supported her cause of action.
Bechtel responds that the court considered additional evidence and
therefore essentially "converted" the motion to one for summary judgment.
Summary dismissal must be denied if a right of recovery can be
established under any provable set of facts. Smith v. Acme Paving Co.,
16 Wn. App. 389, 393, 558 P.2d 811 (1976) (citing Fleming v. Smith,
64 Wn.2d 181, 185, 390 P.2d 990 (1964)). There is, however, no need to
convert a motion to dismiss on the pleadings into one for summary
judgment when the operative facts are undisputed, the core issue is one
of law, and whatever else might be presented would not change the
disposition of the motion. Ortblad v. State, 85 Wn.2d 109, 111, 530 P.2d
635 (1975).
Here, by alleging willful disregard, Ms. Judy's complaint did state
a claim upon which relief could be granted. Judgment on the pleadings,
either under CR 12(b)(6) or CR 12(c) /2 was therefore technically
incorrect. Bechtel's motion should have been for summary judgment under
CR 56. The facts are, however, undisputed and would remain undisputed on
remand. The only issue is one of law-whether the facts alleged
constitute sufficient certainty of injury as to permit the action against
Bechtel to proceed. Remand would serve no purpose. Both this court and
the trial court considered this issue.
Even were we to assume the presence of two earlier industrial injuries,
the result would not change. No one was more familiar with Ms. Judy's
limitations than Ms. Judy herself. She did not have to be told of
physical limitations to experience them. Here, Ms. Judy asked for no
special accommodations. No professional judgment was required here. The
procedural error was then harmless. Ortblad, 85 Wn.2d at 111.
HEHF and Dr. Smick Liability
HEHF Is Not Ms. Judy's Employer. HEHF claims IIA employer
immunity by its participation in a comprehensive Special Insuring
Agreement. Under the agreement, DOE contractors contribute 2.5 percent
of payroll to DOE, which deposits the funds with the Department of Labor
and Industries (L&I) to pay employee claims. HEHF contends all Hanford
contractors, including, of course, HEHF, are therefore one statutory
employer for the purposes of the IIA.
Standard of Review. Again our review is de novo. DuVon v.
Rockwell Int'l, 116 Wn.2d 749, 753, 807 P.2d 876 (1991). The issue of
IIA immunity is decided as a matter of law when the facts are undisputed.
Id.; Folsom, 135 Wn.2d at 671.
An employee cannot sue his or her employer for a workplace injury.
RCW 51.04.010. But, absent that employment relationship, claims are not
barred by the IIA. Deeter v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 50 Wn. App. 67,
80, 747 P.2d 1103 (1987) (Grosse, J., concurring) (citing 2 Arthur
Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 65.10 (1986)).
Common Fund. HEHF first claims employee status based on its
payments into a common Hanford contractors L&I fund. Under Washington's
IIA, payment of premiums into a common fund does not create immunity
absent an employment relationship. Hildahl v. Bringolf, 101 Wn. App. 634,
648, 5 P.3d 38 (2000), review denied, 142 Wn.2d 1020
(2001). An employer-employee relationship cannot be created without the
worker's knowledge and consent for the purposes of Washington workers'
compensation law. Fisher v. City of Seattle, 62 Wn.2d 800, 806,
384 P.2d 852 (1963). The hallmark of such a relationship is the employer's
right to control the employee's conduct. Hildahl, 101 Wn. App. at 642
(citing Novenson v. Spokane Culvert & Fabricating Co., 91 Wn.2d 550,
553, 588 P.2d 1174 (1979)).
Ms. Judy did not consent to employment by HEHF. And HEHF did not exercise
control over her. Under the terms of the Special Insuring Agreement, the
Hanford contractors paid contributions to the DOE, which handed them over
to L&I. The funds were put into a bank account in L&I's name. L&I took
title to the moneys, evaluated the claims, and paid the benefits. HEHF may
have contributed to a common pool to pay the premiums. But Bechtel was Ms.
Judy's only employer.
The authorities cited by HEHF to the contrary all address the immunity
afforded a subsidiary or division. HEHF is neither. For example, in
Manor v. Nestle Food Co., /3 the parent company was entitled to
immunity because it had fulfilled its L&I obligation by paying the
subsidiary's worker $455,000 out of its insurance fund. HEHF had no such
obligation to Bechtel's workers.
Agency. HEHF next argues that it serves as the agent of Bechtel
and as such is entitled to immunity. Under the common law, an employer who
engages another firm in an agency relationship, retaining control over the
firm's work, is the employer of the second firm's injured worker.
Fisher, 62 Wn.2d at 807.
Bechtel had no control over the work of HEHF physicians. And the
fact that Bechtel hired HEHF to perform the evaluation here does not
affect HEHF's third party status.
In Deeter and Wolf v. Scott Wetzel Servs., Inc., /4
an L&I claimant sued the independent firm that administered the self-
insuring employer's L&I program. The court held that the administrator
shared the employer's immunity. These holdings do not help HEHF, which
had no such relationship with Bechtel.
HEHF was not Ms. Judy's employer nor the agent of her employer, nor
the administrator of her employer's pension plan. And it is not,
therefore, immune from a third party action.
Duty to Inform of "Abnormal Condition." Ms. Judy next contends
that Dr. Smick and HEHF breached their duty under RCW 7.70.030(1) /5 to
inform her of adverse test results. HEHF responds that no court has found
liability in an employment examination context absent some contact between
the doctor and the patient.
Standard of Review. Whether one owes a duty of care to another is
a question of law. DuVon, 116 Wn.2d at 753; Folsom,
135 Wn.2d at 671. Issues of material fact remain if it is not possible to
make the determination as a matter of law on the record. Evans v.
Thompson, 124 Wn.2d 435, 439, 444-45, 879 P.2d 938 (1994).
It is often difficult to define the scope of the duty owed by health
care providers to recipients and to distinguish duty from proximate
cause. But failure to make this distinction leads to both flawed
analysis and disposition. Hunt v. King County, 4 Wn. App. 14,
21, 481 P.2d 593 (1971).
Statutory Liability. Under the common law, medical malpractice
liability arose only in the context of a physician-patient relationship.
The doctor who identified the physical deficiency (tuberculosis) could not
be held negligent because the doctor was not the worker's physician. He
was an agent of the company. Riste v. Gen. Elec. Co., 47 Wn.2d 680,
289 P.2d 338 (1955).
In Washington, the medical malpractice act, chapter 7.70 RCW, extends
malpractice liability beyond traditional physician-patient relationships.
RCW 7.70.030; Eelbode v. Chec Med. Ctrs., Inc.,
97 Wn. App. 462,
467, 984 P.2d 436 (1999). For example, by its terms the malpractice act
applies to physical therapists and other non-physician health care
providers who do not establish doctor-patient relationships with the
people they serve. RCW 7.70.020; Eelbode,
97 Wn. App. at 469. Any
person acting as an agent of a physician (RCW 7.70.020(2)), and any entity
employing a physician or physical therapist (RCW 7.70.020(3)), are also
subject to the malpractice statute. The duty to follow the accepted
standard of care applies with full force to these health care workers. RCW
7.70.030(1); Eelbode, 97 Wn.
App. at 467.
To establish malpractice, however, the plaintiff must prove that a
health care provider "failed to exercise that degree of care, skill, and
learning expected of a reasonably prudent health care provider at that
time in the profession" acting in the same or similar circumstances; and
that such failure was a proximate cause of the injury complained of. RCW
7.70.040.
Daly v. United States /6 interpreted RCW 7.70.030(1).
There, a preemployment screening X ray revealed a shadow on Mr. Daly's
lung, but the tuberculosis test was negative. This combination should
have triggered a diagnosis of sarcoidosis, a potentially fatal disease
that is treatable in its early stages. Daly v. United States,
946 F.2d 1467, 1468 (9th Cir. 1991). Mr. Daly's sarcoidosis was not
diagnosed for several years because he was not informed of the results.
The progress of the disease was arrested, but only after significant
impairment. Daly holds that RCW 7.70.030(1) applies to health
care providers who perform preemployment screenings outside a doctor-
patient relationship.
After Daly, Division II decided Eelbode. There, a
physical therapist negligently administered a preemployment test,
directly injuring the plaintiff's back. Citing Daly,
Eelbode concluded RCW 7.70.030 created potential liability,
notwithstanding the lack of a doctor-patient relationship.
Eelbode, 97 Wn. App. at 468. The extent of the physician's duty
to the worker in employment examinations, however, has not been fixed.
The accepted standard of care imposes upon employment-screening
medical examiners a duty to correctly diagnose manifestly abnormal
conditions, or at least to inform the worker of abnormal test results.
Daly, 946 F.2d at 1470-71. But this duty is not coextensive
with that of the person's own doctor, where the purpose of the
examination is therapeutic. Id. at 1470. In the context of
employment examinations, "the physician's duty should be less extensive."
Id.; Beadling v. Sirotta, 41 N.J. 555, 561, 197 A.2d
857 (1964) (scope of duty owed is not coextensive with duty owed to
private patient seeking report as to status of health).
The factual scenario here is two steps removed from both Daly and
Eelbode. Dr. Smick did not conduct the examination or have any
contact with Ms. Judy. Neither did the examination injure Ms. Judy
directly or fail to reveal any existing abnormal condition requiring
treatment.
Bechtel referred Ms. Judy to HEHF to compare her physical capacity
with the requirements of her job and to report those results to her
employer. Dr. Smick competently did this. There can be no malpractice
when there is not only no doctor-patient relationship, but no contact, no
intent to diagnose, treat or otherwise benefit the patient, no injury
directly caused by the examination, no failure to diagnose or notify the
patient of an illness disclosed by the examination, and no dispute as to
the accuracy of the reported results.
No jurisdiction goes this far. And Daly does not require
this result in Washington. It is consistent with chapter 7.70 RCW and
other Washington law to hold that doctors have a duty to perform
employment screenings competently, not to inflict injury, and to inform
the worker of any unknown morbid condition disclosed. But the duty of
complete and accurate reporting of the findings runs only to the person
ordering the tests. See, e.g., Hafner v. Beck, 185
Ariz. 389, 916 P.2d 1105, 1107 (1995).
Common Law Negligence. Ms. Judy makes an alternative case for
common law negligence, based on the duty of reasonable care imposed on one
who "gratuitously undertakes to render services which he should recognize
as necessary to another's bodily safety, and leads the other in reasonable
reliance on the services to refrain from taking other protective steps, or
to enter on a dangerous course of conduct . . . ." Hoover v.
Williamson, 236 Md. 250, 254, 203 A.2d 861, 10 A.L.R.3d 1064 (1964);
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1965).
According to this view, Bechtel may well have no obligation to
determine her physical condition. But having gratuitously undertaken to
do so, the employer created an expectation that she would be told of any
dangerous condition disclosed by that examination. Because she
was denied this information, Ms. Judy contends that she refrained from
taking protective steps and continued to perform heavy physical labor.
Several courts have held the employer liable on this theory. But
none has extended liability to the doctor. E.g., Wojcik v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 18 Misc.2d 740, 744, 183 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1959)
(employer liable for negligent omission to advise worker of tubercular
condition discovered during a pre-employment physical examination);
Dornak v. Lafayette Gen. Hosp., 399 So. 2d 168 (La. 1981)
(ditto).
If the doctor does no more than direct or supervise an employment
examination, he is not liable. Hoover, 236 Md. at 255. In
Hoover, the doctor was liable because he referred the employee
to a consultant, advised the employee about the state of the employee's
health, and misrepresented the employee's physical condition. Id.
Ms. Judy cites to no authority for the proposition that a
physician overseeing or performing a physical capacities evaluation has a
duty to inform the worker of a negative result based on otherwise normal
findings.
We affirm the trial court's summary dismissals.
BROWN, A.C.J., and KATO, J., concur.
_______________
1 127 Wn.2d 853, 904 P.2d 278 (1995).
2 "Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. After the pleadings
are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may
move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary
judgment and disposed of as provided in rule 56, and all parties shall be
given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to
such a motion by rule 56."
3 131 Wn.2d 439, 452, 932 P.2d 628, 945 P.2d 1119 (1997).
4 113 Wn.2d 665, 782 P.2d 203 (1989).
5 "No award shall be made in any action or arbitration for damages
for injury occurring as the result of health care which is provided after
June 25, 1976, unless the plaintiff establishes one or more of the
following propositions:
"(1) That injury resulted from the failure of a health care provider
to follow the accepted standard of care[.]"
6 946 F.2d 1467 (9th Cir. 1991).